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and unreasonable duties by a foreign government. In that
there is no delegation of legislative discretion, for it is not
left to the Executive Department to determine whether the
articles in question shall be admitted free of duty, or subject to duty, nor to fix the rate of duty, if they are to be
admitted subject to duty; but the rate of duty is fixed by
the act, and the contingency upon which the articles are
to be admitted free of duty, or subject to duty, is made by
the act to turn not upon the President's will, but upon the
President's determination of a fact.
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T.. by his will, devised the residue of his estate to his executors for
two live. in being, and by its thirty-fifth article requested them to procure the incorporation of an institution to be known as the "Tilden
Trust." for the purpose of maintaining a free public library and readingroom in the city of -NewYork, and to promote such scientific and educational objects as they might more particularly designate, and authorized
them to convey to such institution, if its incorporation was satisfactory,
during the lifetime of the survivor of the two lives in being, all the residue of the estate or so much as they deemed expedient. In case the institution was not incorporated during the lifetime of the two persons
named, or if for any cause or reason the trustees should deem it inexpedient to convey said residue to. or apply it to the use of, said institution,
then they were authorized to apply it to such charitable, educational and
scientific purposes as, in their judgment, would render it most widely
and substantially beneficial to the interests of mankind. Held, that the
devise was invalid, as there was no certain designated beneficiary who
oould enforce the trust, and it rested entirely in the discretion of the
trustees to give such part of the estate as they deemed expedient to the
Tilden Trust. or to withhold all from it.
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The provisions of the will as to te residue could not be upheld as
constituting a separate trust or power in trust, as the power,, although not
depending for its execution on the will of the trustee, could not be enforced by the courts at the suit of a beneficiary.
The fact that the executors procured the incorporation of the Tilden
Trust in a form and manner satisfactory to themselves, and have deemed
-it expedient to convey, and have executed a conveyance, cannot be considered in passing upon the validity of the will.
The thirty-fifth article of the will did not convey separate powers
upon the trustees, and the provision leaving the disposition of the estate
discretionary, if the executors did not "deem it expedient" to endow the
Tilden Trust, could not be eliminated from the will without destroying
the scheme that the testator designed for the disposal of his estate. The
whole article represented one entire and inseparable charitable scheme,
and could not be subdivided, and the power conferred on the trustees
was one of selection.
To render a power in trust valid, the same certainty as to the beneficiary must exist as in the case of a trust.
(BRADI.EY, POTTER and VANN, J. J., dissent.)

The facts are sufficiehtly set forth in the opinion of
the Court.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

BROW-, J.-Samuel J. Tilden died in August, i886,
leaving a last will and testament dated in April, 1884. He
left surviving him, as his only next of kin and heirs-at-law,
one sister, two nephews, one of whom is the plaintiff in
this action, and four nieces.
The defendants, Bigelow, Green and Smith, were by
the will appointed the executors thereof and trustees of the
trusts therein created, and the will having been duly admitted to probate in October, 1886, they immediately
qualified and entered upon the discharge of their duties as
such.
This action was brought to obtain a construction of
the will. By the complaint the thirty-third, thirty-fourth
and thirty-fifth articles were assailed as being invalid, but
upon the trial no question was raised as to the first two
named, and no determination in respect thereto was made.
The Supreme Court held that the effect of the thirtyfifth and thirty-ninth articles of the will was to create one
general trust for charitable purposes, embracing the entire
residuary estate, and vested in the trustees a discretion with
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respect to the disposition of such estate by them; that
the testator did not intend to and did not confer upon any
person or persons any enforceable right to any portion of
said residuary estate, and did not designate any beneficiary
who was or would be entitled to demand the execution of
the trust in his or its behalf, and declared the provision of
the will relating to the disposal of the residuary estate for
such reasons illegal and void.
It is essential, to a proper understaInding of tfie will,
to read the two articles above named together, and they are
here quoted, the last being placed first :
" ThIro-nint.-I hereby devise and bequeath to my
said executors and trustees, and to their successors in the
trust hereby created, and to the survivors or survivor of
them, all the rest, residue and remainder of all the property, real and personal, of whatever name or nature, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be seized or possessed,
or to which I may be entitled at the time of my decease,
which may remain after instituting the several trusts for
the benefit of specific persons ; and after making provision
for the specific bequests and objects as herein directed, to
have and to hold the same unto my said executors and
trustees, and to their successors in the trust hereby created,
and the survivors or survivor of them in trust, to possess,
hold, manage and take care of the same during a period
not exceeding two lives in being ; that is to say, the lives
of my niece, Ruby S. Tilden, and my grandniece, Susie
W. Whittlesey, and until the decease of the survivor of the
said two persons, and after deducting all necessary and
proper expenses, to apply the same, and the proceeds
thereof, to the objects and purposes mentioned in this, my
will."
" Tirty-fiflh.-I request my said executors and trustees to obtain, as speedily as possible, from the legislature,
an act of incorporation of an institution to be known as the
"Tilden Trust," with capacity to establish and maintain
a free library and reading-room in the city of New York,
and to promote such scientific and educational objects as
my said executors and trustees may more particularly

TILDEN V. GREEN ET AL.

designate. Such corporation shall have not less than five
trustees, with power to fill vacancies in their number;
and in case said institution shall be incorporated in a
form and manner satisfactory to my said executors and
trustees during the lifetime of the survivor of the two lives
in being upon which the trustee of my general estate
herein created is limited, to wit, the lives of Ruby S. Tilden and Susie Whittlesey, I hereby authorize my said executors -and trustees to organize the said corporation, designate the first trustees thereof, and'to convey or apply to
the use of the same the rest, residue and remainder of all
my real and personal estate not specifically disposed of by
this instrument, or so much thereof as they may deem expedient, but subject, nevertheless, to the special trusts
herein directed to be constituted for particular persons, and
to the obligations to make and keep good the said special
trusts, provided that the said corporation shall be authorized by law to assume the obligations. But in case such
institution shall not be so incorporated during the lifetime
of the survivor of the said Ruby S. Tilden and Susie Whittlesey, or if for any cause or reason my said executors and
trustees shall deem it inexpedient to convey said rest,
residue and remainder, or any part thereof, or to apply. the
same or any part thereof to said institution, I authorize my
said executors and trustees to apply the rest, residue and
remainder of my property, real and personal, after making
good the said special trusts herein directed to be constituted, or such portion thereof as they may not deem it expedient to apply to its use, to such charitable, educational
and scientific putposes as, in the judgment of my said executors and trustees, will render the said rest, residue and
remainder of my property most widely and substantially
beneficial to the interests of mankind."
On March 26, 1887, subsequent to the commencement of this action, the legislature passed an act incorporating the "Tilden Trust," and authorizing it to establish
and maintain a free library and reading-room in the city
of New York. The institution was organized, and the
executors and trustees made to it a conveyance which was
formally accepted by the trustees thereof.
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The law is settled in this State that a certain designated beneficiary is essential to the creation of a valid
trust.
The remark of Judge WRIGHT, in Levy z'. Levy,'
that "if there is a single postulate of the common law
established by an unbroken line of decisions, is that a
a 'trust without a certain beneficiary who can claim its
enforcement is void," has been repeated and reiterated by
recent decisions of this court,2 and the objection is not obviated by the existence of a power in the trustees to select a
beneficiary, unless the class of persons in whose favor the
power may be exercised has been designated by the testator with such certainty that the Court can ascertain who
were the objects of the power.
The equitable rule that prevailed in the English Court
of Chancery, known as the Cy-ftres doctrine, and which
was applied to uphold gifts for charitable purposes when
no beneficiary was named, has no place in the jurisprudence
of this State.'
If the Tilden Trust is but one of the beneficiaries
which the trustees may select as an object of the testator's
bounty, then it is clear and conceded by the appellants that
the power conferred by the will upon the executors is void
for indefiniteness and uncertainty in its objects and purposes. The range of selection is unlimited. It is not confined to charitable institutions of this State or of the United
States, but embraces the whole world. Nothing could be
more indefinite or uncertain, and a broader and more unlimited power could not be conferred than to apply
the estate to "such charitable, educational and scientific
purposes as in the judgment of my executors will render
said residue of my property most widely and substantially
beneficial to mankind."
"A charitable use where neither law nor public policy
'33 N. Y., 107.
"Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y., 76; Holland v. Alcock, iob id..
312; Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y., 56o.
3 Holmes ,;. Mlead, 52 N. V., 332 : Holland v. Alcock. supbra.
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forbids may be applied to almost anything that tendsl to
promote the well-doing and well-being of social man.''
"Such a power is distinctly in contravention of the
policy of the Statute of Wills. It substitutes for the will
of the testator the will of the donees of the power, and
makes the latter controlling in the disposition of the testator's pr.operty.. That cannot well be said to be a disposition by the will of the testator with which the testator had
nothing to do except to create an authority in another to
dispose of the property according to the will of the donee
of the power. 2
Unless, therefore, within the rules which control courts
in the construction of wills, we can separate the provision
in reference to the Tilden Trust from the general direction
as to the disposition of the testator's residuary estate, contained in the last clause of the thirty-fifth article, and find
therein that a preferential right to some or all of such
estate is given to that institution when incorporated, and
one which the Court, at the suit of said institution, could
enforce within the two lives which limit the trugt, we
must, within the principle of the case cited, declare such
provision of the will invalid and affirni the judgment of
the Supreme Court. The appellants claim that the power
conferred upon the executors to endow the Tilden Trust
may be upheld independent of the invalidity of the power
given to apply the estate to such charities as would most
widely benefit makind.
The proposition is, that by the thirty-fifth article the
testator made two distinct alternative provisions for the disposition of his residuary estate-one primary, for the incorporation and endowment of the Tilden Trust, the other
ulterior, and to be effectual only in case the' executors
deemed it inexpedient to apply the residue to that corporation; and it is claimed tjiat.this provision of the will con9titutes a trust to be executed for the benefit of the Tilden
Trust, br confers upon the trustees a power in trust, or that
it constitutes a gift in the nature of an executory devise.
1Perry on Trusts, No. 637.
2

Read v. Williams, sigbra, p. 569.
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The latter proposition rests upon the assumption that
there is by the will a primary gift, complete and perfect in
itself, to the Tilden Trust, that vests the title in that corporation immediately upon its creation.
That a valid devise or bequest may be limited to a
corporation to be created after the death of the testator,
provided it is called into being within the time allowed for
the vesting of future estates, isnot denied.'
That question was decided in Inglis v. Trustees of the
Sailors' Snug Harbor2 and in Burrill v. Boardman.'
In those cases the gift was treated as in the nature of
an executory devise, dependent upon the incorporation of
'the institution contemplated by the will, and which would
vest upon the occurrence of that event.
But in view of the language of the will before us, that
proposition cannot be maintained here.
By an executory devise a freehold was limited to commence in the future, and needed no particular estate to
support it. It arose upon the happening of a specified
event, and the fee descended to the heir-at-law until the
contingency happened. By our Revised Statutes executory devises are abolished, and expectant estates are substituted in their place; and such estates, when the contingency
happens upon which they are limited, vest by force of .the
instrument creating them, and this right in the expectant
cannot be defeated by any person. But the testator here
intended not to create such an estate. The Tilden Trust
takes nothing by virtue of the will. The residuary estate
is vested in the trustees, or intended to be, and it is solely
by their action that it is to become vested in the Tilden
Trust.
It is only in case that the executors deem it expedient
so to do that they are to convey the whole or any part of
the residuary to the Tilden Trust. Whether that corporation should take anything rested wholly in the discretion
of the executors, as the expediency or inexpediency of an
act is always a matter of pure discretion.'
1 Perry on Trusts, 372, No. 736.

23 Peters, 99.

843 N. Y., 254.
6

42 Perry on Trusts; N 507, 508.
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Every expression used in the will indicates the bestowal
of complete Idiscretionary power to convey or not to convey,
and the creation and bestowal of such power in the executors are wholly opposed to and fatal to the existence of an
executory devise.
'In this respect the case differs from those cited. In
Inglis v. the Sailors' Snug Harbor, there was no trust
created, no discreion vested in the*executor, no conveyance to be made after the testator's death. His intention
to give his property to a corporation to be created to carry
out his charitable purpose was clear. Such was the fact
also in Burrill v. Boardman.
By the will in that case the property was given directly
to the corporation which the testator contemplated should
be created after his death. No trust was created, and no
discretion was bestowed upon the executors to determine
whether the corporation should or should not have it.
Once created, the property by force of the will vested
in the corporation. The only similarity between that case
and this is, that the trustees there, as here, were directed to
apply to the legislature for an act of incorporation. In
case the legislature refused to grant a liberal charter, then
the trustees were directed to pay over the estate to the
Government of the United States.
But no discretion was given to the executors to determine, upon any event, whether or not the corporation once
created should take the property.
"Nothing," said Chief Justice CHURCH, "can be
more certain than that the testator designed that the title
to the funds or property in the possession of the trustees
or elsewhere, which was included in the residuary clause,
should vest in the corporation immediately upon its creation."
"A n application was to be made to the legislature after
the testator's death for a charter. If obtained, the bequest
would take effect; if not, it would go to the ulterior donee.
If the corporation applied for and granted should not be
liberal, and in accordance with the provisions of the will,
the ulterior donee or next of kin could challenge its right
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to take the bequest. It would then become a judicial
question." So, clearly, no question in that case was left
to the judgment of the trustees. They were not to determine even whether the charter was a liberal one. That
was a question for the Court that would have been decided
in any contest over the property between the corporation
and the next of kin or ulterior donee. A discretionary
power in executors or trustees was not, therefore, an element in the Burrill case. Not so here. Here we have the
unlimited authority delegated to the executors to withhold
the entire property from the corporation if they choose so
to do. There, the corporation once created was vested immediately by force of the will with the title to the property.
Here, although the corporation may be created in a form
and manner satisfactory to the trustees, it takes nothing
unless the executors, considering every cause and reason,
deem it expedient to convey to it some of or all of the
residuary estate.
In the Burrill case the testator made a direct gift to a
designated beneficiary-the Roosevelt Hospital. In this
cage Mr. Tilden gave nothing to the Tilden Trust, but
simply authorized his executors to endow it if,
in their
judgment and discretion, they should deem it expedient.
Moreover, after creating numerous special trusts and setting apart portions of his estate for such several special
trust funds, the testator, by the thirty-ninth article of the
will, gives the whole of the residuary estate to his executors in trust for the purposes mentioned in the thirty-fifth
article, bestowing upon them, so far as language could do
so, the titfe to all the property to be held and possessed
during the lives of his niece, Ruby S. Tilden, and his
grandniece, Susie Whittlesey, and which he denominated
the "General Trust" of his estate. He clearly intended
by this provision to create an active trust in his whole
residuary estate, and to give to his executors a discretionary
power to give such part of it as they deemed expedient to
the Tilden Trust, or to withhold all from it. Having in
tended to convey, so far as he was able to do, the title to
his whole estate to trustees, nothing was left that could be
the subject of a gift to the Tilden Trust.
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We come therefore to the consideration of the question,
whether the thirty-fifth article can be upheld as constituting
a separate trust, or power in trust, for the benefit of the
Tilden Trust.
The affirmative of this question can be maintained
only by considering the direction to convey to the Tilden
Trust as a power separate by itself, and distinct and independent from the power to convey to such charitable purposes as, in the judgment of the trustees, would be most
widely and substantially beneficial to mankind.
The latter provision is eliminated from the will altogether by the appellants, and then the instrument is construed as if eliminated provision had never existed.
The appellants invoke the aid of the principle, that
where several trusts are created by a will which are independent of each other and each complete in itself, some of
which are lawful and others unlawful, and which may be
separated from each other, the illegal trusts may be cut off
and the legal ones permitted to stand. This rule is of frequent application in the construction
of wills, but it can be applied only in aid and assistance'of
the manifest intent of the testator, and never where it
would lead to a result contrary to the purpose of the will,
or work injustice among the beneficiaries, or defeat the testator's scheme for the disposal of his property.
The rule, as applied in all reported cases, recognizes
this limitation, that when some of the trusts in a will are
legal and some illegal, if they are so connected together as
to constitute an entire scheme, so that the presumed wishes
of the testator would be defeated if one portibn was retained
and other portions were rejected, or if manifest injustice
would result from such construction to the beneficiaries, or
some of them, then all the trusts must be construed together, and all must be held illegal and must fall.'
The cases cited fairly illustrate the practical application of this rule by the courts.
IManice v. Manice, 43 N. Y., 303; Van Schuyver v. Mulford, 59 id.,
426; Knox v. Jones, 47 id., 389; Benedict v. Webb, 98 id., 46o; Kennedy v. Hoy, 1O5 id., 135.
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In Knox v. Jones, the testator created one trust to receive and pay over the income of his estate to his brother
for his life, and then to his sisters, with cross-limitations
over as between them, the remainder to the children of his
sister Georgiana, and, in default of children, to Columbia
College.' This Court held the whole trust invalid, and refused to sustain the provision in behalf of the testator's
brother, on the ground that there was but a single trust,
which provided for all the beneficiaries, and that they were
all embraced in a common purpose; that the several provisions of a single trust could not be severed, and those that
violated the statute against perpetuities dropped and the
others sustained. In Van Schuyver v. Mulford, a gift to
the testator's wife of the rents and income and profits of
the estate during life was upheld and declared to be valid
although the devise over might be void, on the ground that
the gift to the wife was separate and distinct from the
other provisions of the will, and bad no effect beyond her
life or upon the ultimate disposition of the estate.
In Benedict v. Webb, the testator created separate
trusts in two-thirds of his estate for the benefit of his four
children. Three of the trusts were held to be valid, and
one invalid on the ground that the trust term transgressed
the statute. But the Court refused to sustain the valid
trusts, on the ground that to do so would defeat the intention of the testator in the disposition of his property, and
work injustice among the beneficiaries by permitting three
of the children to take, under their respective trusts and
also as heirs-at-law, in the one-fourth as to which the trust
was declared invalid.
The result of these and All other cases is, that in applying the rule invoked by the appellants, which permits unlawful trusts to be eliminated from the will and those that
are lawful to be enforced, we must not violate the intention of the testator, or destroy the scheme that he has created for the disposition of his property.
We may enforce and effectuate his will, and give full
effect to his intent, provided it does not violate any cardinal
rule of law; but we cannot make a new will, or build up a
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scheme, for the purpose of carrying out what might be
thought was, or would be, in accordance with his wishes.
At the threshold of every suit for the construction of a
will lies the rule that the Court must give such construction to its provisions as will effectuate the general intent
of the testator as expressed in the whole instrtimeiit. It
may transpose words and phrases, and read its provisions in
an order different from that in which' they appear in the
instrument, insert or leave out provisions if necessary, but
only in aid of the testator's intent and purpose-never to
devise a new scheme or to make a new will.
The fact that the executors of the will applied to the
legislature, and procured the incorporation of the Tilden
Trust in a form and manner satisfactory to themselves, and
have deemed it expedient to convey to it the whole residuary estate, and have executed a conveyance thereof, is not
a matter for consideration in this connection. This point
was considered in Holland v. Alcock, and in Read v. Williams, sufra, and it was held that the validity of the power
depended upon its nature and not on its execution. In the
latter case the testator bequeathed the residue of his estate
"to such charitable institutions and in such proportion as
my executors, by and with the advice of my friend, Rev.
John Hall, D.D., shall choose and designate." And prior
to the commencement of the action the executors, with the
advice of Dr. Hall, made a written choice and designation
of certain incorporated institutions existing under the laws
of this State, among whom they directed the residuary estate to be divided. The fact of selection was not deemed
material, and the will was declared invalid.
The rights of heirs and next of kin' exist under the
statutes of descent and distribution, and vest immediately
upon the death of the testator.
If the trust or power attempted to be created by the
will, or the disposition therein made, is valid, their rights
are subject to it; but if invalid, they immediately become
entitled to the property. Hence the existence of a valid
trust is essential to one claiming as trustee to withhold the
property from the heir or next of kin. What a trustee or
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donee of a power may do becomes, therefore, immaterial.
What he does must be done under a valid power, or the act
is unlawful. If the power exercised is unauthorized, the
act is of no force or validity. In such case there is no
trust or power. There is nothing but an unauthorized act,
ineffectu4l for any purpose.
It is not deemed material to the decision of the question now under consideration, whether the provisions of the
will relating to the residuary estate are regarded as constituting a trust, or a power in trust, except so far as that fact
may be indicative of the testator's intention.
If there was a trust, then the executors took title to
the residuary estate ; but if there is created a valid power
in trust it will be executed with substantially the same
effect as if the will created a trust estate. But Section 58
of the Statute of Uses and Trusts declares that when
an express trust is created for any purpose not enumerated
in the foregoing sections, no estate shall vest in the trustees; but the trust, if directing the performance of an act
which may be lawfully performed under a power should
be valid as a power in trust, is not, of course, susceptible
of the construction that a trust, invalid because in conflict
with some cardinal rule of law, could be upheld as a power.
Every trust necessarily includes a power. There is
always something to be done to the trust property, and the
trustee is empowered to do it ; and if'the trust is invalid
because the power to dispose of the property is not one that
the law recognizes, it cannot be upheld as a power in a
trust. The rules applicable to the execution of trusts in
this respect are equally applicable to the execution of
powers ; and as it is of no particular importance in this
case in whomh the title to the residuary estate is vested, it
is not material to the decision whether the provisions of the
will are examined as a trust, or as a power in trust. The
purpose of the trust is lawful, and personal property, which
constitutes the greater part of the testator's estate, was a
proper subject of the trust that the testator intended ; and
if it is invalid, it is because the power conferred on the
trustees for the disposal of the estate is so uncertain and
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indefinite that its execution cannot be controlled or enforced by the courts.
In Prichard v. Thompson, the legal title to the fund
was vested in the executors' trust. In Read v. Williams,
the executors were given a power in trust. But the Court
said that there was in that respect no legal distinuption, and
the power in the latter, as the trust in the former case, was
declared invalid.
But the nature of the estate which the testator intended
to convey to his trustees, and the nature of the power intended to be delegated to them, is of importance in ascertaining his intent, and determining what was'the scheme
that he had for the disposal of his property. By our Revised Statutes, Vol. I, P. 733, powers as they existed by the
common law were abolished, and thereafter their creation,
construction and execution were to be governed by statute.
They are classified as general and special, beneficial and in
trust. A beneficial power is one'that has for its object the
grantee of the power, and is executed solely for his benefit.'
Trust powers, on the other hand, have for their object persons other than the grantee, and are executed solely for the
benefit of such other persons. 2 Trust powers are imperative,
and their performance may be compelled in equity unless their
execution or non-execution is made expressly to depend on
the will of the grantee.' And a trust power does not cease to
be imperative where the grantee of the power had the right of
selection among a class of objects. Sec. 97 and Secs. ioo and
ioi make provision for the execution by a court of equity of
trust powers where the trustee dies, or where the testator has
created a valid power, but has omitted to designate a person to execute it. A trust power to be valid, therefore,
must designate a person or class of persons other than the
grantee of the power as its objects, and it must be exercised
for the sole benefit of such designated beneficiary, and its
execution may be compelled in equity. A non-enforceable
imperative power is an impossibility under our law unless,
by the instrument creating it, it is expressly made to depend for its execution on the will of the grantee.
ISec.

79.

2Secs. 94-95.

3Sec. 96.
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In every case where the trust is valid as a power, the
lands to which the trust relates remain in or descend to the
persons otherwise entitled, subject to the execution of the
trust as a power.'
Before applying these rules to the case before us, our
duty is to ascertain the testator's intent from an inspection
of the will, and for this purpose we must read the whole
instrument, including the provisions admitted to be void.
Those provisions, though ineffectual to dispose of the
property, cannot be obliterated when examining it for the
purpose of ascertaining the testator's intention. 2
The prominent fact in the testator's will is, that he intended to give his property to charity. He intended that
none of his heirs or next of kin should take any of it,
except such as he gave to them through the several special
trusts that he created for their benefit. He emphasized
this purpose in the last article of his will, by providing that
any of them who should institute or share in any proceeding to oppose the probate of this will, or to impeach,
impair, or to set aside or invalidate any of its provisions,
should be excluded from any participation in the estate,
and the portion to which he or she might otherwise be entitled to, under its provisions, should be devoted to such
charitable purposes as his executors should designate. To
the accomplishment of this purpose he intended to create
a trust, and doubtless believed that he created a valid one.
He created numerous trusts for the benefit of his relatives,
and for the creation of other libraries and reading-rooms.
In the thirtyThese he denominated " Special Trusts."
ninth article he devised and bequeathed to his executors,
and "to their successors in the trust hereby created, and to
the survivor and survivors of them," all the rest and residue of his property, "to have and to hold the same unto
my said executors and trustees, and to their successors in
the trust hereby created, . . . to possess, hold and
manage the same" during the lives of his niece, Ruby S.
'I R. S., 729, 59.
2
Van Kleeck v. Dutch Church,
N. Y., 220.

20

Wend., 457; Kiah v. Grenier, 56
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Tilden, and his grandniece, Susie Whittlesey, and " to
apply the same and the proceeds thereof to the objects and
purposes mentioned in this my will." He gave to his
executors the power to collect the income of the whole
estate, that which was set apart in the special trusts and
that constituting the trust of the residuary estate. The
trust of the residuary estate he denominated the "General
Trust," and' in the twenty-sixth article he gives direction
as tor the disposition of the surplus income during the
continuance of the trust of my general estate."
It is clear, therefore, that the testator intended to
create a trust of his residuary estate, and in plain, unequivocal language he indicated his purpose to be, that the
trustees should be vested with the title to the property
until they should divest themselves of it in carrying out the
purposes mentioned in the will, and which are to be found
in the thirty-fifth article. Turning to this article, the important feature is, that the power there given to the trustees,
and the only power that could absolutely effectuate the
testator's intent to devote his property to charity, was an
imperative one.
There is no discretion to be exercised upon the question whether the property shall go to charitable purposes.
There is no act involving that disposition of the property,
the execution of which. is made to depend on the will of
the trustees.
Discretion there is as to the objects of the charity, but
none as to the general disposition of the estate. If the
Tilden Trust is incorporated in a form and manner satisfactory to the trustees, they are authorized to convey to
that institution the whole residue, or so much thereof as
they shall deem expedient; and if for "any cause or reason''
they deem it inexpedient to endow that institution with the
whole or any part of the residue, then to apply the same,
or such part as they do not apply to the use of the Tilden
Trust, to such charitable purposes as they-shall deem most
widely beneficial to mankind.
The object and purpose in this scheme of the testator
is, therefore, a devotion of his estate to charity. But it is
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said that the Tilden Trust represents an intention different
in form from the alternative gift to the charitable, educational and scientific purposes mentioned in the last clause of
the article.
That the authority to endow it that is vested in the
trustees is a primary power, and. the power to devote the
estate to the other undefined purposes, is ulterior.
That while the latter is imperative in its character,
the former is discretionary wholly, and depends for its
execution upon the will of the trustees, and that each
power stands alone, separate and distinct from the other,
and the power to endow the Tilden Trust is likened to a
power of appointment.
Powers of appointment are so common in testamentary
dispositions of property that no citation of authority is
necessary to show their validity.
Their execution may depend solely upon the will of the
donee of the power, and they are recognized as valid by the
ninety-sixth section of the statute already quoted: "I give
to A. such portion of my residuary estate as B. shall, within
the lifetime of the survivor of C. and D., designate and appoint," which, in the case suggested on the brief, is undoubtedly a good testamentary bequest, and is a good illustration of a naked power of appointment, the execution of
which depends on the. will of B., and is not enforceable at
the suit of A.
In such a case the title to the property descends to the
heirs or next of kin, or passes under the will to the ulterior
donee, subject to the execution of the power. But there is
no similarity between the suggested bequest and the will
before us. Follow that bequest by a gift over to charitable
uses, or let it stand alone in the will, and you have in one
case alternative gifts and in the other alternative purposes.
There is a preference, expressed or implied, by the
testator as to the purpose to which his estate shall go and
the objects that shall be benefited.
In the one case the choice lies between the individual
legatee and the heirs ; in the other between the legatee and
a disposition to charity.
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But in the will before us there is no alternative purposes. There is a single scheme, a gift to charitable uses,
and the suggestion of the Tilden Trust indicates no intent
in the testator's mind contrary to the intention to devote
the estate to charity, and in this respect the will before us
is distinguished from the case suggested by the learned
counsel for the appellants of a power to convey the estate
to a designated individual at a stated age, and in the event
of the donee of the power deeming it expedient so to do,
then a gift over to undefined charitable uses.
There the primary purpose of the testator is a gift to
the designated legatee and not to charity. And the intent
to give the estate to charitable uses- is secondary, and
limited upon the determination of the trustee not to make
the primary gift. Such a will plainly indicates alternative
purposes and contains alternative powers. The two gifts
are in no respect connected, and if the gift over is void,
the first may stand, and, if executed, represents' the will of
the testator.
But in the thirty-fifth article of the will under consideration there is no antithesis so far as the purpose to
which the property is to be devoted is concerned. It expresses a single intent only, namely, to devote the estate to charitable uses; and while, of course, in such a
scheme the testator might prefer and designate one corporation over another as the object of his bounty, I.shall
attempt to show that in this case he has not done that, and
has not conferred any preferential right to the estate, or any
part of it, upon the Tilden Trust.
What is the Tilden Trust, and how does it stand in the
testator's scheme?
It may fairly be assumed that the testator, having determined to devote his estate to charity, understood that
his object could be accomplished only through the instrumentality of a corporate body.
He requested his trustees to cause the Tilden Trust to
be incorporated. It was to have the power to establish and
maintain a free library and reading-room in the city of New
York, and "to promote such scientific and educational ob-
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jects" as the executors and trustees should designate. The
latter power is precisely what the trustees are authorized
to do by the so-called ulterior provision, viz.: to apply the
estate to such "educational and scientific purposes" as
they should judge would be most beneficial to mankind.
Here, therefore, we have an authority to do the same
thing in each provision of the will ; and as the latter could
only be worked out through the medium of a corporation,
the so-called two powers are the same. So as to the free
library and reading-room. That is plainly within the scientific and educational purposes of the second provision of
the will, and could be maintained only through a corporate
body. The suggested capacities of the Tilden Trust are,
therefore, precisely the same as the so-called ulterior purposes, and each is expressive of the testator's scheme so
far as he had formulated it in his own mind. The Tilden
Trust, therefore, plainly does not represent any alternative
or primary purpose in the disposition of the estate, but is
simply the suggested instrument to execute the testator's
scheme for the disposition of the property. Now, what did
the testator intend the trustees should consider when they
came to the determination of the expediency or inexpediency of endowing that institution? The argument is, that
they could not consider the ulterior purposes at all until
they had disposed of the question whether it was expedient
to convey to the Tilden Trust all or a part of the residuary
estate.
But that is saying that they should determine that
question without reference to the substance of the gift and
the object and purposes which the testator had in view.
Vor, as I have already shown, the capacities and powers of
the Tilden Trust-in other words, its purposes and objects,
or, rather, the purposes and objects which the testator intended to effectuate through its instrumentality-are precisely the same as the so-called ulterior purposes ; and as the
latter must be carried out through the instrumentality of a
corporation, the only distinction between the two is in the
name of the corporation that is to administer the fund. The
question of expediency, therefore, resolves itself into a ques-
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tion whether the trustees should select the Tilden Trust
or some other corporation through which to carry out the
purposes of the will. Now, how could the trustees,
charged with the imperative duty of devoting the estate to
charitable and educational purposes, consider the question
* whether they should endow the Tilden Trust without taking a complete view of the whole field of charity?
They were bound to do so if'they fairly attempted to
carry out the testator's plan.
Take the question of the free library and reading-room.
There is no duty or obligation imposed upon them in that
respect. They are not bound to create or endow one. They
are free to select any other educational object. So with
locality. Can it be seriously claimed that there is any duty
resting on them to establish a library in the city of New
York? Is not the capital of the State or of the United
States open to their choice of location if they think a library located there would be more widely beneficial to mankind? Clearly, it appears to me that it was within the
scope of the discretion committed to the trustees to determine whether a free library or reading-room should be
established at all, and whether that or any other charitable
or educational institution that they might select should be
located in the city of New York, and that their determination of such question would be among the causes or reasons which might lead them to decide that it was inexpedient to endow the Tilden Trust, and that the testator
intended that, when the trustees should consider the Tilden
Trust, they should consider their power with reference to
the disposal of the estate and the fact that if they did not
endow that institution they could still execute his wishes
by applying it to such charitable, educational and scientific
purposes as they should select.
In other words, that if they did not give it to the institution that he suggested, and which would bear his
name, they could give it to others, and still execute his will
and carry out his general purpose for the disposal of his
estate; and this power meant comparison of all charitable
and educational objects and selection from among them.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

In substance he said to his executors: I have determined to devote my estate to charitable, educational and
scientific purposes. I have formed no detailed plan how
that purpose can be executed, but under the law of New
York it must be done through and by means of a corporation. I request you to cause to be incorporated an institution to be called the Tilden Trust, with capacity to maintain a free library and reading-room in the city of New
York, and such other educational and scientific objects as
you shall designate ; and if you deem it expedient, that is,
if you think it advisable and the fit and proper thing to do,
convey to that institution all or such part of my residuary
estate as vou choose ; and if you do not think that course
advisable, then apply it to such charitable, educational ad
scientific purposes as in your judgment will most substantially benefit mankind. Thus was left to the trustees the
power to dispose of the estate within the limits defined, and
to select the objects that should be benefited; and it is
impossible to read the thirty-fifth article and find therein
any preference in the way of a separate gift or power to the
Tilden Trust, or to separate that institution from the testator's plan to devote his estate to charity. The trustees are
free to select the Tilden Trust and cause it to be incorporated, or to choose any existing corporation as the instrument to carry out the testator's scheme. Again, no event is
named upon the happening of which any estate is limited
to the Tilden Trust. The only condition suggested is the
determination by the trustees of the question whether they
deem it expedient to endow that institution. But if the
views already expressed are correct, if the Tilden Trust is
but one of many instruments through which the testator's
charitable purposes may be executed, or is but a suggested
beneficiary under the power, then the determination of the
question of expediency involves the doing of the very thing
which the law condemned, viz. : a selection from an undefined and unlimited class of objects, and the power would
be void.
It thus becomes apparent .howimportant is the socalled ulterior provision in the plan which the testator had
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for the disposal of his estate ; and effect cannot be given
to that plan if that provision is stricken from the will, as
it expressly defines the scope of the discretion committed to
the trustees.
Strike out that provision, and instead of a discretion
in the trustees limited to the selection of the objects that
should be benefited by the will, their power would be confined
to the endowment of the Tilden Trust; and, if they
choose to act, or failed to act, the estate would go to the
heirs-at-law. Indeed, the legal effect of the will would
be in that case to vest the title to the estate in the heirs
subject to the execution of the power to endow the Tilden
Trust.
But if the provision of the will mhkes one thing particularly clear, it is that the testator intended his estate to
be devoted to charitable purposes, and should in no event
go to his heirs, and he did not intend that his trustees
should have the power to choose between his heirs and the
Tilden Trust.
We cannot, therefore, obliterate the so-called ulterior
provision and give effect to the scheme of the will.
The discretion plainly conferred on the trustees, in the
delegation of the power to determine the expediency or inexpediency of endowing the Tilden Trust, would thereby
be destroyed, and the trustees would be compelled to convey the estate to that institution, or by permitting the heirs
to retain it thwart the expressed wish of the testator.
Again, the appellants argue that the power to endow
the Tilden Trust is one depending for its execution on the
will of the trustees, and is not imperative, and hence not
subject to the test whether it can be enforced in a court of
equity. This argument is, perhaps, fairly answered when
the conclusion is reached that the ulterior purpose cannot
be stricken from the will, and that the thirty-fifth article
represents but one scheme and one purpose for the disposal
of the estate.
But it will be apparent, in the view taken, that the
testator did not intend that any power conferred upon his
trustees should depend for its execution upon their will.
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Of course, in every power where the trustees have the
right to select any and exclude others, there is necessarily
involved discretion, and the final choice does, in one sense,
rest upon the will of the trustee, but not as that term is
used in the statute. The power conferred is the authority
to convey the estate. That is imperative. The discretion
committed to the trustee was to select the particular object.
The choice depends on the trustee's will, but the act of
choosing is imperative, else the power could not be executed. It is the result alone, therefore, that depends on
the will of the trustees, and not the performance of the act
of selection. A power is defined to be "an authority to do
some act

.

.

.

which the one granting or reserving such

power might himself lawfully perform."' Section 58 provides that if the unauthorized trust there mentioned directs
the performance of any act which may be lawfully performed
under a power, it shall be valid as a power in trust.
Now the acts authorized by the testator were those of
selection and conveyance. The result of selection depended
on the will of the trustees, whether they should choose one
corporation or another, but the performance of the act of
selection was just as obligatory as the duty to convey. The
testator intended both should be performed, and the trustees could no more refuse or neglect one than the other. It
follows from the views here expressed that the authority to
endow the Tilden Trust, if that should be deemed expedient by the trustees, was not a separate power, distinct from
the purpose to devote the estate to charitable uses, but was
incidental to the testator's scheme and involved therein.
While we may admit that the testator expressed a preference for a corporation that should bear his name, lie conferred no right upon that institution. The purpose to
which the estate should be applied he determined and
designated, but the persons who should be benefited by the
will and the particular institution that should administer
the fund were left to the selection of the trustees.
The expressibn of a preference conferred no right, so
long as the final choice was left to the trustees.
i R. S., 732. 74.
7
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It was simply a suggestion, which they might or might
not adopt, and imposed no duty upon them and in no way
limited or fettered their action.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the thirty-fifth
article of the will does not confer separate powers upon the
trustees, and that the so-called ulterior provision cannot be
eliminated from the will without destroying the scheme"
that the testator designed for the disposal of his estate ;
that the whole article represented one entire and inseparable charitable scheme and cannot be subdivided, and the
power conferred on the trustees is one of selection.
This power was, under the statute, special and in
trust. Under the sections heretofore quoted such a power
is imperative, and imposes a duty on the grantee, the performance of which may be compelled in equity for the
benefit of the parties interested, unless its execution or
non-execution is made expressly to depend on the will of
the grantee, and it does not cease to be imperative where
the grantee has the right to select any and exclude others
of the persons designated as the objects of the power.
The power conferred by the will not being made to
depend for it6 execution on the will of the trustee was,
therefore, imperative, but it is not valid unless it can be
enforced by the courts at the suit of some beneficiary.
As the selection of the objects of the trusts was delegated absolutely to the trustees, there is no person or corporation who could demand any part of the estate or maintain an action to compel the trustees to execute a power in
their favor. This is the fatal defect in the will. The will
of the trustees is made the controlling, and not the will, of
the testator. Such an authority is in contravention of the
statute of wills.
That statute authorizes a person to "devise" his real
estate and "to give and bequeath" his personal property,
but it does not permit him to delegate to another the power
to make such disposition for him.
As was said by the learned presiding Justice of the
'Lawrence
note.

z Cooke, 104 N. Y., 632;

2

Pomeroy's Eq.Juris., iox6,
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general term: "The radical view of the entire provision
seems to have arisen from the testator's unwillingness to
confer any enforceable rights upon any qualified person or
body. "'
Under the statute of powers there may be a power of
selection and exclusion with regard to designated objects,
and the duty there imposed is made imperative and enforceable by the Court.
But the statute presupposes that a power of selection
must be so defined in respect to the objects, that there are
persons who can come into court and say that they are embraced within the class and demand the enforcement of the
power.'
The views which Judge VAN BRUNT expressed in that
case on that point at general term received direct approval
in the court. He said: "It is conceded that the power
contained in the clause in question comes under the head
of a special power in trust as defined in the Revised Statutes,
but it is said such a power is to be distinguished from a
trust; that the words 'in trust' are used for purposes of
classification only." We think, however, that to render a
power in trust valid the same certainty as to beneficiary
must exist as in the case of a trust.'
These views find full confirmation in the provision of
the statute to the effect that if the trustee dies, leaving the
power unexecuted, a court of equity will decree its execution for the benefit equally of all persons designated, and if
the testator fails to designate the person by whom the
power is to be executed, its execution develops upon the
court (sections ioo and ioi), thus providing a scheme
which prevents the failure of a testator's purpose when its
subject is certain and its objects designated.
But in this case execution of the power could not be
decreed by the Court in either of the cases specified in the
statute.
By an enforceable trust is meant one in which some
person or class of persons have a right to all or a part of a
1Read v. Williams, supra, p. 569.
2
Read v. Williams, 27 N. Y. State Rep., 507.
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designated fund, and can demand its conveyance to them,
and in case such demand is refused, may sue the trustee in
a court of equity and compel compliance with the demand.
In this case the testator devolved upon his executors
the duty of selecting the beneficiary, and there is no person
who has the right to enforce that duty or demand any part
of the estate in case the executors refuse or neglect to act.
The power attempted to be vested in the trustees cannot be controlled or enforced, and whether the provisions
of the will relating to the residuary estate be regarded as
*creating a trust or power in trust, they are in either case
void.
The judgment must be affirmed.
DISSENTING OPINION.
BRADLEY, J. (dissenting).-This action, for the construction of the will of Samuel J. Tilden, deceased, was
founded on the charge that it was ineffectual to dispose of
the residuary estate, or to provide for any lawful disposition
of it, because the provisions of the thirty-fifth article, by
which that was sought to be accomplished, were invalid in
that they were, as to both the object and' subject of the trust
he had in view, indefinite and uncertain. If this proposition is supported, the conclusion that such was the effect
necessarily follows.
It is evident that the testator, when he made his will,
intended not to die intestate as to any of his property.
And that his purpose to make testamentary disposition of
all of it, not only appears by the dispositional provisions
of his will, but also by those of the forty-third article, by
which lie declared: "Since I have made a disposition of
my property according to my best judgment, and since, as
most of the devisees under it are females, it is impossible
to foresee under what influences some one or more of them
might possibly come; and since it is desirable to avert
unseemly or speculative litigation, I hereby declare it to
be my will that in case any person who, if I had died intestate, would be entitled to any share of my property or
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estate, shall, under any pretence whatever, institute, take
or share in any proceeding to oppose the probate of this
my last will and testament, or to impeach or impair, or
to set aside or invalidate any of its provisions, any devise
or legacy to or for the benefit of such person or persons
under this will is hereby revoked, and such person shall
be excluded from any participation in, and shall not have
any shiare or portion of my property or estate, real or personal; and the portion to which such person might be
entitled, under the provisions of this instrument, shall be
devoted to such charitable purposes as my said executors
and trustees shall designate."
In proceeding to the consideration of the questions
presented, it may be observed, as a cardinal nile of construction, that the intent of a testator should be sought for
in the plovisions of his will, and, when so ascertained,
effectuated, if the langua ge used permits, although the
transposition, rejection or the supply of words may be required to clearly express such intention. And when susceptible of it, the construction will be given which renders
it operative rather than invalid.'
He had in view the creation and endowment of a Tilden
Trust, with the capacity mentioned. He, therefore, requested the executors and trustees to obtain as speedily as
possible from the legislature an act of incorporation of an
institution to be kiown as the Tilden Trust, and in case
that should be accomplished within the time limited by
the two lives mentioned, he authorized them to organize
the institution, and to convey or apply to its use the rest,
residue and remainder of his estate, or so much of it as
they should deem expedient. Thus far he has, in practical effect, directed the application to be made for legislative
action, and has made no provision for the disposition of
the fund other than to the use of the corporation in the
event of its creation. And because that was a contingency
not within the control of the executors and trustees, and
for other reasons which might exist at the time of his
1

Hoppock v. Tucker, 59 N. Y., 203: Phillips v. Davies,
Du Bois v. Ray, 35 id., 162.

92

id., i99;
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death to render the endowment of the Tilden' Trust, if
created, inexpedient, the testator, with a view to entire
testacy, added : "But in case such institution shall not be
so incorporated, . .

.

or if for any cause or reason my

said executors and trustees shall deem it inexpedient to
convey said rest, residue and remainder, or any part
thereof, or to apply the same, or any part thereof, to the
said institution, I authorize" them to apply it, "ok such
portion thereof as they may deem inexpedient to apply to
its use, to such charitable, educational and scientific purposes as in the judgment of my said executors and trustees
will render the said rest, residue and remainder of my property most widely and substantially beneficial to the interests of mankind." This provision, treated independently
The cy pres docof any other, requires no consideration.
trine, available to give effect to trusts for charitable uses,
without any defined beneficiary in England, has no place
in the law of this State. The attempt thus made by the
testator to provide, in the event mentioned, for a trust
dependent upon the selection by the executors and trustees
of the charitable, educational and scientific purposes to
which the fund should be applied, was ineffectual and
void for indefiniteness and uncertainty.'
The proposition on the part of the appellants is, that by
the thirty-fifth article the testator made two distinct alternative provisions for the disposition of the residue of his
estate; that the one relating to the incorporation and
endowment of the Tilden Trust was primary, and the
other following it was ulterior, and intended (if that institution was incorporated) to be made effectual in the event
only that the executors and trustees deemed it inexpedient
to apply such residue, or only a portion of it, to the Tilden
Trust. On the contrary, the counsel for the respondents
contend that there are no such separate alternative provisions in the article, but that the testator there provided
for the disposition by the trustees of his residuary estate
to charities, etc., of which the Tilden Trust was one of the
312;

IPrichard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y., 76; Holland v. Alcock, xo8 id.,
Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y., 56o.
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objects, and that the power given to the executors and
trustees was that of selection merely. In some cases it
has seemingly been held that when words of a will, expressing a class of beneficiaries or objects of a trust may be
taken distributively, and some of them are lawful objects
of the trust and others not, it may be effectual as to the
former; but the weight of authority is otherwise, and in
such case the power of mere selection in execution of the
trust, attempted to be so given, is wholly void.'
If that view, as applied to the present case, is suppoited, the conclusion must follow that the testator failed
by his will to make any valid provision for the disposition
of his residuary estate. Then the trusts and the power
which the testator attempted to create and vest in his executors would constitute a single scheme for the appropriation of the fund by them to such charitable, educational
and scientific purposes as they should choose to select. But
a different question is presented if the provision relating to
the creation and endowment of the Tilden Trust may be
legitimately treated independently of that following it, by
which lie sought to make provision for such general undefined purposes. Then the effect of the former would not
necessarily be embarrassed by any relation to the latter.2
The disposition of this question depends upon the construction to which that article of the will may be entitled,
having in view the principles applicable to the interpretation of such instruments.
As has already been seen, the first duty imposed upon
the executors was to seek, by legislative act, the incorporation of the Tilden Trust. And it may be assumed that this
was not required or designed as a useless ceremony. When
that should be effected they were authorized to organize
the corporation, designate its first trustees, and convey to
it or apply to its use the residue of his estate, or so much of
'Williams v. Kershaw, 5 Cl. & Fin., Iii; Vezey v. Jamson, i Sim.
& Stu., 69; Ellis v. Selby, x My. & Craig, 286; Mitford v. Reynolds,
i Phillips, i9o; .n re Jarman's Estate, L. R., 8 Ch. Div., 584; 25
Moak, 490.
2 Savage v. Burnham, I7 N. Y., 561; Schettler v. Smith, 41 id., 328;
Manice v. Manice, 43 id., 303; Kennedy v. Hoy, 2o5 id., 134.
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it as they should deem expedient. We need go no further
to see the purpose for which the Tilden Trust was intended
in its relation to the fund. How is the purpose so represented
necessarily qualified by any of the provisions following it?'
There were certain contingencies in view which would
have the effect to defeat the execution of the power to endow such an institution, and upon which the limitation of
the fund or some portion of it to general charitable, educational and scientific purposes was provided for. The first
was the failure tp obtain the incorporation of the Tilden
Trust. In that event the testamentary disposition of the
residue of the estate was dependent upon such provisions
for application to charitable, etc., purposes. But if it
should be incorporated, the contingency depended upon the
determination of the executors and trustees, to the effect
that it was expedient to apply a portion only, or inexpedient to apply any part of the fund to that institution. It
quite plainly appears that the testator intended, that if legislative action could be effectually had for that purpose, the
Tilden Trust should be incorporated, and,.that being accomplished, its endowment should first be considered and determined; and that in the event .only that it should by the
trustees be deemed inexpedient to apply to it any of the
residue of his estate, or expedient to apply to it less than
the whole of such estate, would there be any occasion to
seek other charitable, educational or scientific purposes to
which to appropriate the fund, or any portion of it.
It is urged that, because the gift of the testator is, by
the terms of the will, made to the executors and trustees,
their power is that of selection, and consequently there is
no limitation created by the testator, and can be no primary
or ulterior gift within the import of the language employed.
But gifts may be made by a testator by means of powers
vested in trustees to whom the estate is devised and bequeathed, and limitations contingent in character may be
dependent upon the execution or non-execution by the trustees of powers conferred upon them. The question whether
the provisions for the disposition of the residuary estate are
or are not alternative, primary and ulterior, is one of con-
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struction. The fair interpretation of the language of the
thirty-fifth article permits, and the evident intent of the
testator as there manifested requires, the conclusion that the
two are alternative provisions, and that they are primary and
ulterior. The former is definite in its object ; the latter is
otherwise.
It is true, that by the terms of the thirty-ninth article
the testator devised and bequeathed all of his residuary
estate to the executors and trustees for the purposes mentioned in the will. This is designated at other places in
his will as "general trust," to distinguish the residuary
fund from the various special trusts created by the will.
But this does not necessarily qualify or modify the construction to which the provisions of the thirty-fifth article
would otherwise be entitled in the respect we are now considering them. The manner in which the fund should be
applied was dependent upon contingencies, some of which
were within the powers vested in the executors and trustees. Yet the purpose of the devise and bequest must be
considered in reference to the power conferred upon them
by the provisions of that article, and in view of the manner in which it might, by virtue of those provisions, be
properly executed.
The arbitrary exercise of power may characterize the
effect which may be given to it, rather than its purpose.
So in the present case the executors and trustees could
have unfaithfully exercised their discretion upon the question of expediency. But while the test of expediency or
inexpediency was left to their discretion, they could not,
consistently with the intent of the testator, as plainly manifested by his will, have applied ally part of the fund to the
purposes of the general charity mentioned in such ulterior
provision until they had in good faith determined, for
"some cause or reason," that it was inexpedient to apply
it or some, and what portion of it, to the Tilden Trust.
And although the exercise of discretion may not be
subject to judicial control or review, it may be said that,
for the purpose of interpretation, it is the intent of the
donor so made to appear that properly measures the discre-
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tionary power of those who are to execute it, and not the
opportunity for its unfaithful execution found in its discretionary character. The power vested in the executors and
trustees was not that of a mere selection of a beneficiary or
beneficiaries amongst all the objects which were employed
within the scope and meaning of the thirty-fifth article;
they were not authorized to reach the consideration of the
undefined objects of charity, etc., there referred to, for the
*purpose of selection from them, until they had disposed of
the question whether the specific beneficiary, the Tilden
Trust, should or not be endowed. That was the definite
object to which their attention was first to be directed, and
the question of the application to it of the fund to be determined. This the trustees were to do before any matter
of selection from amongst indefinite charities was reached.
The scope of inquiry for that purpose was to be extended
to other objects "if for any cause or reason" they should
deem it inexpedient to apply any part of the residuary fund
or expedient to apply less than the whole of it to the Tilden
Trust, and not otherwise. This seems to have been the
purpose the testator had in view, as appears by the provisions of that article. This is not repugnant to any other
provision of the will. And his intent, as manifested by the
language used, must be effectuated if it can be consistently
with the rules of law.'
The provision for the Tilden Trust must, therefore, be
treated as primary and distinct from that of general charities, etc. And the question whether or not the former
provision was effectually made remains to be considered.
It is requisite to the validity of any provision of a will that
it is or may become capable of lawful execution ; and that
test is applicable as of the time of the death of testator.
There may be future contingencies provided for upon
which gifts are made to depend, and beneficiaries may not
be definitely known or ascertained at the time of the testator's death. It is sufficient that they are so described as to
be ascertained in the future when the right accrues to reISmith v. Bell, 6 Peters, 68; Wager v. Wager, 96 N. Y., 164; Roe v.
Vingut, i7

id., 204.

DISSENTING OPINION.

ceive the gift: Holmes v. Mead, 22 N. Y., 322 ; Shipman
v. Rollins, 98 id., 311. And a devise or bequest may be
limited to a corporation not in existence at the time of the
death of the testator, provided it is created within the time
allowed for vesting of future estates. This question was
considered in Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Peters, 99;
Ould z. Washington Hospital, etc., 95 U. S., 303; and in
this State it was so determined in Burrill v. Boardman, 43
N. Y., 254, and reaffirmed in Shipman v. Rollins, 98 id.,
328. In the Burrill case it was treated as in the nature of
an executory devise dependent upon incorporation of the
institution there contemplated, and it was held that the
estate vested on the occurrence of that event. In that respect that case is distinguishable from the present one, as
in the latter it was contemplated that the vesting should
depend upon the conveyance to the Tilden Trust or application to its use by the executors and trustees to whom, by
the terms of the will, the residuary estate was devised and
bequeathed. This distinction arises out of the fact that
upon the contingency which enabled the institution in the
Burrill case to take the fund, the trust upon which the
trustees held it terminated, and there was no opportunity
remaining for any limitation over, while it was otherwise
in the case at bar. But, treating the provisions of the
thirty-fifth and thirty-ninth articles of the will as creating
a trust power, it is not seen that the fact that the estate did
not vest in the corporation on its creation necessarily has
of itself any essential importance for the purpose of the
question now under consideration, provided the power was
adequately given to convey or apply it to the use of the institution. While it could not in that case be deemed what
was formerly known as an executory devise, it might, in
behalf of the Tilden Trust, be treated as a conditional limitation of the estate or a power dependent foi its execution
upon a condition.
The testator evidently intended to vest in the executors and trustees all the control he could of the title to his
residuary estate. But it cannot, for the purposes of the
question here, be assumed that he intended their relation
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to it should be other than the legal effect of that which
they took by the will. As to the realty, no title passed to
the trustees, and no trust within the statute was created.
When, by the statute, express trusts were reduced to those
for the execution of which taking of the title was deemed
essential, I R. S., 728, § 55, it took from others none of the
elements of trusts other than such as were dependent upon
the title as formerly taken by trustees, and none of the powers of -execution not so dependent. And it was provided,
that when an express trust should thereafter be created
for purposes other than those enumerated in § 55, no title
should vest in the trustees, but if the trust directed or authorized the performance of any act which might lawfully
be performed under a power, it should be valid as a power
in trust: Id., 729, § 8. If, therefore, the provisions of
the thirty-fifth article of the will would, but for the statute,
have constituted a trust, and authorized the performance of
any act which might lawfully be performed as such, they,
so far as related to the real property in the residuary estate
of the testator, created a power in trust. And although
the large part of such estate was personalty, and the trust,
as to that, is not subject to the statute, the distinction in
that respect, for the purposes of the questions requiring
consideration, need not be observed, as the subject of
powers is substantially applicable alike to both.'
It is urged that by the provisions in question the testator neither directed nor authorized the performance of any
act of disposition of the residuary estate which could lawfully be performed within the meaning of the statute defining a power in trust; and that there was not only no party
to effectually- demand their execution, but they had no enforceable character. It is true, the creation of a trust depends upon the nature of the provisions by which its
creation is sought. It is also the rule that a trust is imperative ; and at common law the same rule is applicable
to a power coupled with a trust, although otherwise as to a
2
naked power.

1 Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y., 522; Hutton v. Benkard, 92 id., 295.
22

Story Eq. Jur.,.

io6i.
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The primary one of those provisions certainly was
not enforceable at the death of the testator. There was
then no Tilden Trust; and its then future existence was
contingent. When it was created, its ability to take depended upon its incorporation being in form and manner
satisfactory to the executors and trustees, and that being
so, it was made discretionary with them whether the institution should have the whole, or any, and what portion, of
the residuary fund. It would, therefore, seem to follow
that upon the incorporation of the Tilden Trust it could
not, without action of the trustees, have enforced conveyance or application to it of the fund or any portion of it.
In that view, and upon the construction given to the thirty.
fifth article, the question is whether the trustees were enabled to vest the fund in the Tilden Trust, or by the exercise of discretionary power given to them could have
afforded to that institution the right to demand and enforce,
in that respect, the execution of the provision of the will
in its behalf. As already seen, the testator did not intend
to die intestate as to any portion of his property; and that
he did intend to impose upon his executors and trustees
the imperative trust power for the disposition of his residuary estate appears by the provisions of the thirty-ninth
article, by which he directed them " to apply the same and
the proceeds thereof to the objects and purposes mentioned"
in the will. This is borne out by the terms of the thirtyfifth article, by imputing to him the understanding that
the secondary provision of that article was valid, as upon
the contingency there mentioned he provided for the disposition of it. And the latter provision cannot be overlooked, but must be consulted to ascertain his intent with
a view to the aid, so far as it may furnish it, to the inter-"
pretation of the other provision in question.' But if the
primary provision was of itself valid in its object, purpose
and effect, it was not invalidated by the fact that the trustees were, in terms in the event stated in the article, empowered to apply the fund to the indefinite purposes menIVan Kleeck v. Dutch Church, 20 Vend., 457, 471 ;Kiah v. Grenier,
56 N. Y., 220.
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tioned in the ulterior provision for which testamentary
disposition of property could not lawfully be made.'
In other words, the limitation to the indefinite objects
did not deny to the former provision for the Tilden Trust
the effect to which it otherwise may have been entitled.2
In such case the subject would be within the control of the
Court, and on proper application it would restrain the use
of power for such unlawful purpose. The contention of
the respondents' counsel is, that it was essential to the
validity of the provision in behalf of the Tilden Trust, that
the residuary estate should have vested in it at the time it
came into corporate existence, or that the institution
should then have been entitled to demand and enforce, by
decree of the Court, the conveyance to it or the application
to its use of the fund by the trustees. This proposition
(upon the construction here given to the provisions in
question) in effect seems to be, that a trust or trust power
could not exist with or survive the intervention of the discretionary power which the testator intended to give the
trustees. But it may be observed, that while a valid trust
is imperative, attending it may be powers upon which
limitations and executory bequests may be contingent,
and the exercise of those powers may be in some sense discretionary.'
It is very likely that if the testator had apprehended
the invalidity of the ulterior provision of the thirty-fifth
article, he would have provided a different limitation in
the event there mentioned. But it cannot be assumed that
the primary provision for the appointment and disposition
of the residuary estate to the Tilden Trust would have
been other than that which he made.
The efficiency of the power given by this provision is
IAtty.-Genl. v. Lonsdale, i Sim., io5; Saulsbury v. Denton, 3 Kay
&J., 529; Carter v. Green, id., 591.
2
Savage v. Burnham, 17 N. Y., 561; Kennedy v. Hoy, 105 id., 134;
6 N. Y. State Rep., 787.
3
Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 3S, 468; I6 Wend., 6I, 176; Mason v.
Jones, 4 Sandf. Ch., 623; 13 Barb., 461 ; Costabadie v. Costabadie, 6Hare,
410; French v. Davidson, 3 Madd., 396; Walker v. Walker, 5 id., 424;
Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves., 27.
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not dependent upon the character of the ultimate limitation, nor is it less effectual than it would have been if that
had been to a lawful object of testamentary gift. The
difference is, that in the one case it was within the power
of the trustees to defeat the disposition by the will of the
residuary estate, and in the other they could not.
But in the latter case they, by the execution of the
discretionary power, could have rendered the ultimate provision ineffectual and, for the purposes of the disposition
of the fund, inoperative. And, therefore, unless the contingency arose upon which the ultimate limitation of it
was dependent, it would not be important for any practical
purpose whether it was valid or not, and in that event only
would an enforceable character of the trust or trust power
be essential to effectuate the intent of the testator. His
purpose, it must be assumed in view of the power given,
would be accomplished by the disposition to the incorporated institution designated by him. The creation of
this power in nature and purpose was lawful, and through
its execution the gift to the Tilden Trust could legitimately
be effected, although in respect to the appointment to that
institution it was made dependent upon the will of the executors and trustees. While it is essential to a trust, as
such, that it be imperative and therefore enforceable by decree in equity when the time arrives for its execution, it is
not so of a mere power, or necessarily so of a trust power,
although the latter is imperative, unless its execution or
non-execution is made expressly to depend upon the will
of the grantee. The testator intended to make the execution of the power of appointment to the Tilden Trust dependent upon the will of the trustees, as expressly appears
by the provision creating it. The contention, therefore,
that this power of the primary provision was invalid
because its execution was not judicially enforceable in
equity on behalf of that institution, does not in the view
taken seem to be maintained. The imperative character
intended by the testator to be made applicable, and in a
certain event to be applied to the disposition of the residuary estate, had relation to the ultimate limitation, which
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was dependent upon the contingency that the trustees, in
their discretion, concluded not to appoint to the Tilden
Trust any or only a portion of such fund. And as such
limitation was invalid for indefiniteness and uncertainty in
its object, the testator failed by it to effectually make any
imperative provision for the disposition of the residuary
estate by means of a trust, power in trust, or -trust power
enforceable as such, except so far as should be necessary to
make and keep good the special trusts as directed.
And as the will furnished no support for an ultimate
limitation of the fund in the event the trustees should have
deemed the execution of the power of appointment to the
Tilden Trust inexpedient, the real property within the
residuary estate descended to the heirs of the testator subject to the execution of the power of appointment and disposition to that institution, and the right of his next of kin
to the administration in their behalf of the personalty of
such estate was subject to the execution of the same power.
Now, by reference again to the provisions of the thirtyfifth article, it may be seen, as plainly appears by their
terms, that the testator intended that the trustees should
exercise the power conferred upon them to consummate the
disposition of the residuary estate for the declared purposes
of the trust. If they were successful in their effort to obtain the corporate charter, it was their duty to determine
whether it was satisfactory, and in the event it was so,
then, unless they deemed it inexpedient to apply any part
of the fund to the Tilden Trust, the further duty was imposed upon them to determine whether it should take all
of it, and if not all, to appoint the amount of it so to be
appropriated. It is apparent that the testator intended to
make the exercise of such power a duty, and essentially
so, to carry out his declared purpose. The discretion
which he evidently intended to give the trustees related
not to the execution of the power, but only to the manner
of its execution. In that view (which seems well supported) may not the limitation to the Tilden Trust have
been lawfully conditional, not only on its incorporation,
but as well upon the manner such preliminary power, discretionary only in that respect, should be executed ?

DISSENTING OPINION.

In Ould v. Washington Hospital,' the estate for the
purposes of the trust was devised to trustees with a view to
the incorporation, after the death of a testator, of an institution to which they, in that event, were to convey the
estate, provided the corporation was approved by them ;
otherwise not. The hospital was incorp6rated, and conveyance made to it by the trustees. The validity of the trust
was contested, and the Court held that the provision relating to a conveyance upon the creation of a corporation approved by the trustees was a conditional limitation of the
estate vested in them.
In that was involved the discretionary power of the
trustees relating to the approval of the corporation. It is
essential that the object and subject of a testamentary dispositional provision be definite, and when so designated
that they are or may become such, and properly ascertained,
a limitation may by the testator be made to depend upon a
future condition having regard to the statute of perpetuities, and such condition may consist of a power resting in
the discretion of a trustee provided for and defined by the
will; and when the condition is fulfilled the limitation may
be enforced.
The doctrine of the common law ol the subject of
powers of appointment and selection, except so far as it
permitted the treatment of them as illusory, is consistent
with the statute relating to powers which provides that "a
power is an authority to do some act in relation to lands.
or the creation of estates therein, or of charges thereon,
which the owner, granting or reserving such power, might
himself lawfully perform." '
The powers iiow under consideration are a special power, and a special power in trust,
which, as defined by the statute, are those where the persons, or class of persons to whom the disposition of lands
is to be made under the power, are designated, id., . 78 :
and, "I, when the disposition which it authorizes is limited to be made to any person or class of persons other than
the grantee of such power, entitled to the proceeds or an-,
portion of the proceeds, or other benefit to result from the
'95 U. S., 303.
s

1mR. S., 732, . 74.
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execution of the power; 2, when any person or class of
persons other than the grantee is designated as entitled to
any benefit from the disposition or charge authorized by
the power."'
The provisions of the thirty-fifth article of the will in
terms, in view of those of the thirty-ninth article, created
a special power in trust; and because the testator intended
that his residuary estate should be disposed of, as directed
by his will, for the purposes of the trusts there mentioned,
the provisions were apparently imperative; such, at all
events, would have been their effect if the ulterior dispo
sition to which the estate was conditionally limited had
been valid.
And the statute provides that " every trust power,
unless its execution or non-execution is made expressly to
depend on the will of the grantee, is imperative, and imposes a duty on the grantee, the performance of which may
be compelled, in equity, for the benefit of the parties interested." " The ultimate limitation was, by the terms of the
will, imperative in the event that the trustees failed, for
any cause, to dispose of the fund under the primary one,
which alone was made dependent upon their discretionary
power. The Tilden Trust could take only through the
power in the nature of that of appointment vested in the
trustees ; and the fact that the exercise of that power was
discretionary, and could not been forced, produced no legal
infirmity in the provisioft relating to that institution, its
ability to take and to the limitation to it dependent upon
such appointment.3
So far as the statute relates to the subject of the power
of appointment, it provides that where, under a power, a
disposition is directed to be made amongst several designated persons, without specification of the share to be
allotted to each, all of them shall be entitled in equal proportion.' But when the terms of the power import that
I R.

S., 734, 95.
2 Id., 734,
96.
Chatteris v. Young, MIadd. & G., 3o; Lancashire v. Lancashire, T
DeG. & SM., 288; 2 Phillips, 657; Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves., 27; Perry on
Trusts, 5c8 ; Hill on Trustees, 49o-2.
41 R. S., 734, 98.
3
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the fund is to be distributed between them in such manner
or proportion as the trustee may think proper, he may
allot the whole to any one or more of such persons in exclusion of the other.' The trust power in such case does
not cease to be imperative.' And if the trustee having
such power shall die, .leaving it unexecuted, its execution
shall be decreed in equity for the benefit equally of all the
persons so designated.' These provisions of the statute
are, in that respect, substantially declaratory of the common law.' It was there, as it is by our statute, a trust
power. And it is not important for the purposes of the
question, whether the designated persons are vested with
the fund subject to the execution of the power, or take by
reason of the power given. In the one case there is a gift
expressed, and in the other implied, which will be executed by decree of the Court in default of execution of the
power by the donee of it.5
No such implication arises where there is a limitation
over of the estate or fund to other objects in default of the
execution of the power by the donee; and, in that case,
the objects of the power take nothing as their beneficial
interest, or the limitation to them is wholly dependent
upon the execution of the power by him.6 And although
the power of appointment and selection rests in the discretion of the trustee, it is valid, and may be effectually executed by him. 7
In the present case, the provision relating to the Tilden Trust conferred upon the trustees a power of appointment and disposition to a definite object, with a limitation
over on default of such appointment; and so far as by the
terms of such provision the execution of the power was left
to the judgment or discretion of the trustees, it was exI R. S., . 99.
2 Id., .97"
4
3Id., Ioo.
Swift z'.
Gregson, I T. R., 432.
5 1 Perry on Trusts, i 250; WValsh v. Wallinger, 2 Russ. & Myl., 7 8;
Lambert v. Thwaites, L. R., 2 Eq., 15 I.
1;Davidson v. Proctor, 19 L. J., N. S., 395 ; 14Jlir., 31 ; Pearce v. Vincent, 2 lyl. & K., 8oo; 2 Bing. N. C., 328; 2 Keen, 230; Goldring v. Inwood, 3 Giff., i39.
- 2 Perry on Trusts, 508; Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves., 561.
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pressly made to depend on their will within the meaning
of the statute. And, as before remarked, the apparent
purpose and effect of this provision were not qualified or
defeated by the fact that the ultimate limitation was to
objects so indefinite as to render it ineffectual. In practical effect it was the same as if the fund had been limited
over to the heirs and next of kin of the testator, as they
necessarily would take in default of the execution of the
power.
In Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y., 602, the fund was bequeathed to the executors with power of appointment and
selection among a designated class of beneficiaries. While
the manner of executing it was discretionary, the trust or
trust power was imperative, and, on default of the executors to execute it, the power would survive them, and the
designated objects would then, and ultimately, be entitled
to share equally in the fund, and it would be enforced accordingly. But as to those beneficiaries, it would not, in
that sense, and for that purpose, have been imperative, if
there had been a limitation over to other objects on such
default, although, as to the latter, it would have retained
its imperative character. Yet the power thus given of
appointment would have been valid, and may have been
effectually executed.
It is essential to the constitution of a valid trust, or
special power in trust, by a testator, that the objects be so
designated or described that they may be definitely known
or ascertained from the provisions of his will. And it was
the failure of the testator to so designate or define the objects of the attempted trusts which came to the attention
of the Court, and were, for that reason, held invalid.' In
those cases the trust power sought to be given was that of
appointment and selection without limitation over. The
infirmity which rendered invalid the provisions of the wills
in question in those cases was, that no beneficiary- was designated or pointed out by, or ascertainable from, the will:
having any interest in the execution, of the power, or whc
I Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y., 76; Holland v. Alcock, ImR id.,
12; Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y., 56o.
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could assert in court any claim founded upon the trust.
Those provisions of the wills were, therefore, held invalid
for indefiniteness of the classes of objects of the trusts
sought to be created. And in this respect they were distinguished from Power v. Cassidy. The present case is
distinguishable from them in like manner, and further,
that the power given by the primary provision in question
was not that of appointment and selection among members
of a class, but was of appointment and disposition to a definitely designated beneficiary. It is also essential that the
subject of the power be designated and certain, or that the
means be provided by the will to render it properly ascertainable or certain. The provision of the power in that
respect is for the application to the Tilden Trust of the
residue of the estate, or so much of it as the trustees should
deem expedient. The cases before cited, recognizing as
effectual discretionary power given to trustees to regulate,
control or determine the amount which certain beneficiaries should receive of specific funds, to be exercised in reference to circumstances which the donors of the power had
in view, have some bearing upon this question. Those
are the Hawley, 'Mason, Costabadie, French, Walker and
Cole cases, szifra.
The residuary estate was a definite fund; and unless
the trustees determined that it was inexpedient to endow
the Tilden Trust, they were at liberty to apply to it the
entire fund ; but whether expedient to so apply all, or less
than the whole of it, was a matter of judgment of the trustees to be founded upon the amount of the residue in reference to the sum suitably available for the purpose of the
institution, and that was the amount the testator authorized the trustees to appoint to the institution. This was
the means provided by the will to make certain that which,
until such action by the trustees, was uncertain.
In Peck v. Halsey,' it was held that a bequest by
the testatrix of some of her best linen to A. was void for
uncertainty, but that a bequest of such of her best linen as
the executor should think fit, or as the legatee should
choose, would have been good.
2 P. Wins., 399.

TILDEN

V.

GREEN ET AL.

In Kennedy v. Kennedy,' the testator gave all his
household furniture, etc., to trustees, and directed that all
his household property be sold by them except such articles
as his wife should desire to retain, and which lie authorized
her to appropriate to her own use. Held, that the poWer
of selection was effectually given to the wife. And Arthur
v. MacKinnon 2 is to the same effect. It has been seen by
reference to the statute that the power of appropriation of
a fund among the members of a class may be created, and.
the donee of the power be authorized, in his discretion, to
appropriate it in such proportions as he may please. This
was so at common law. When the fund is definitely designated, it would seen that power may be conferred upon
the donee of the power to determine what portion of it may
be appointed to a definite beneficiary designated by the
donor.
Our attention has been called to no authority to the
contrary of that proposition in its application to the present case. The Prichard, Holland and Read cases do not
The
have any necessary application to the question.
contexts,
to
to
their
had
in
reference
reasoning there was
which it was very apt. And the relief of the provision relating to the Tilden Trust from the alternative ulterior
provision, which embraces only indefinite objects, denies
to those cases any practical application to the questions
presented in the case at bar.
While the statute abolished powers as they before then
existed,' it, as said by Judge ANDREWS in Read v. Williams, "does not define all the purposes for which a power
This appears by § 74,
over property may be created."
reviser's
notes,4 as to powers
before referred to, and by the
other than those which are designated as beneficial. They,
except as there enumerated, were abrogated by the statute.5
Treating that in question as a trust power, those considerations of the statute may not be essentially important here.
It must be assumed that the testator, through powers con2L. R., ii Ch. Div., 385.
1io Hare, 438.
92.
6 I R. S., 733,
43 R. S., 2d ed. 590.

1iR. S., 732,

73.
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ferred on his trustees by the thirty-fifth article, intended to
dispose of his entire residuary estate, and, therefore, its
ultimate dispositional provision (in view of article thirtynine) was intended, as by its terms it purported to be imperative; but that character was not unconditionally applicable to the power of appointment and disposition in the
primary provision relating to the Tilden Trust. It had
relation to the limitation over to the objects of the ulterior
provision, and, in consequence of the invalidity of the
latter, his intention, if the trustees had failed to appoint
the Tilden Trust as the beneficiary, would have been disappointed. The purpose of the appointment and disposition to that institution is apparently legal, and, at common
law, may have lawfully been accomplished through the
execution of a power in the manner the testator sought by
his will to do it. It also fairly comes within the purposes
for which a power, as defined by the statute, may be employed.' At common law, a trust may have been attended
with a discretionary power, upon the non-execution of
which the enforceable character of its ultimate limitation
might be dependent. This relation of powers to which
trusts may have been subjected was preserved and provided
for by the statute. And, while a trust power is in its
nature imperative, that character- of it in the sense of being
enforceable may, when its execution or non-execution is
made expressly to depend upon the will of the donee, be
suspended by and during the existence of such discretionary power or determined by its execution.
In the present case, there was involved in the provision
for the Tilden Trust a power in its terms discretionary
and, so far as it was so, its execution or non-execution was
made expressly to depend on the will of the trustees ; and,
the purpose being lawful, it was valid, unless in contravenIt is urged that
tion of the statute against perpetuities.
the limitation, provided for by the thirty-fifth article of the
will, would permit the unlawful suspension of the absolute
power of alienation of the realty and of the absolute
ownership of the personal property constituting the residI R. S.,

, 74.
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nary estate of the testator.' This would be so, and its
effect the invalidity of the limitation, if such suspension would not, by the terms of the will, necessarily terminate within a period not longer than the continuance of
the life of the survivor of the two persons there designated.'
But the thirty-fifth article must be construed in connection
with the thirty-ninth article, and, by the latter, the testator
directed that the executors and trustees "possess, hold,
manage and take care" of the residuary estate during a
period not exceeding such two lives. This, in view of the
further direction that they apply such estate to the objects
and purposes mentioned in the will, which was imperative,
is not consistent with the suspension of the absolute power
of alienation of the real estate, and of the absolute ownership of the personal property beyond that period. It,
therefore, seems that the future estates sought to be created
by the testator were so limited that, by the terms of those
provisions, they would necessarily, and beyond any contingency, have terminated within the period prescribed for
that purpose by the statute, and in that respect they may
be upheld.
These views lead to the conclusion that the provisions
of the will relating to the Tilden Trust and the powers for
their execution given to the executors and trustees were
valid, and, as the consequence, the main purpose of the
action must fail.
Since the commencement of the action, and upon the
application of the executors and trustees, a Tilden Trust
has been incorporated in form and manner satisfactory to
them, and organized. They determined to endow it with
the entire residuary estate, and made to the institution
conveyance and transfer accordingly, subject to provisions
contingently made in the will by the testator in behalf of
special trusts by him created, and as there directed.
It is insisted that the act of incorporation is not such
as was intended by the testator, in that it was not given
the corporate capacity designed by him, and for the further
Ii
2

R. S., 723,

15; id., 773.

Schettler v. Smith, 4

L-

N. Y., 328.
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reason that it designated the executors and testamentary
trustees as permanent trustees of the institution. By the
will he requested them to obtain "an act of incorporation
of an institution to be known as the Tilden Trust, with
capacity to establish and maintain a free library and reading-room in the city of New York, and to promote such
scientific and educational objects-as my said executors and
trustees may more particularly designate. Such corporation shall have not less than five trustees, with power to fill
vacancies in their number; and in case said institution be
incorporated

.

.

.

I hereby authorize my said execu-

tors and trustees to organize the said corporation, designate
the first trustees therof," etc. In the preamble of the act
of incorporation, it is stated that the " executors and trustees deem it inexpedient to designate any purposes of the
corporation

.

.

.

other than the establishment and

maintenance of a free library and reading-room in the city
of New York in accordance with the purpose and intention
of the said testator, " and such was the capacity given by the
act to the corporation. The first section provided that the
three persons (naming them) who were the executors and
trustees, and such other persons as they shall associate
with themselves, and their successors, were created a body
corporate under the name and title of the Tilden Trust ;
and by the second section it was provided that those three
persons should be permanent trustees of such corporation ;
and that they designate and appoint other trustees, so that
the number should not be less than five.
The testator seems to have had in view only one definite purpose of the corporation. That he expressed. Beyond the establishment and maintenance of a free library
and reading-room, he contemplated that the promotion of
some further scientific and educational object might suitably and properly be added and sustained. He, therefore,
provided that the corporate capacity be adapted to such
objects in that respect as the executors and trustees should
designate.
This, however, would be dependent upon circumstances to be determined by them, and he left it to their
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discretion. He evidently did not intend that the corporation for the purpose by him definitely appointed should be
frustrated by the' failure of ihe executors and trustees to
exercise their discretion in such a manner as to give occasion to amplify the corporate capacity'of the institution.
The question whether, after creation of the&corporation for
the free library and reading-room, the executors and trustees may, .by the designation of such further objects, authorize the enlargement of its capacity accordingly, does
not now arise and is not considered.
We think the incorporation was not invalidated by the
manner the capacity of the institution was defined in the
act. No power seems to have been given by the will for
designation and -creation bylegislative act of three permanent trustees of the corporation. It may be'that the testator intended, and Ihe very likely did expect, that the
executors and trustees of the will should become trustees
of the institution, and this 'May have been accomplished in
the way. he provided. But it is seen that the manner provided for the selection of the first trustees of the institution,
in the event it should be incorporated,,' Was such that they
were to be. designated, by his executors and trustees. The
provision made by him for the -organization in that respect
of the institution was not observed or adopted in the act of
its incorporation: Further than this, the question which
may arise upon that situation requires and has here no
consideration.
When the plaintiff commenced this action, it may have
had support in the invalidity of the ulterior provision of
the thirty-fifth article of the will to prevent the application
of any portion of the estate to the indefinite objects and
purposes there mentioned. But as-the executors' and
trustees afterward made a determination which would prevent the application of any part of the fund to those objects
and purposes, no relief in that respect is now essential; and
the only purpose for which further consideration need be
given to that subject has relation to the question of costs,
which, we think, shouldi on behalf of the several parties,
be chargeable to the estate of the testator. The judgments
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of the Court below should, therefore, be reversed and the
complaint dismissed, with costs in tlat and this Court to
all the parties, appellants and respondents, payable out of
the.estate.
Judgment affirmed, with costs payable to all parties
out of the estate.
FOLLtTT, Ch. J., HAIGHT and PARKER, JJ., concur
with BROWN,' J.; BRADLEY, J., reads dissenting opinion,
and POTTER and VANN, JJ., concur therewith.
The object of this note is to point
interested. What concerns him is
out as briefly as possible how far
not the propriety or impropriety of
the principal case is of authority
the particular decision, but the )reoutside of the State of New York.
cise ground upon which the bequest
That the decision was somewhat of
to general charitable purposes was
a surprise to the profession, and
held void, with a view to determine
has been regarded as of more inter- how far the decision is of persuaest and importance than it merits,
sive authority upon the'validity of
would seem clear-from a careful
a similar gift in his own State.
examination of the principles upon
Uncertainty in the objects of a charwhich the opinion of the majority itable gift has long been regarded
of the Court proceeded. Succinctly
as one of its essential characterstated, the ground upon which the
istics. As was well said by Mr.
case was decided was that the gift Binney in his great argument in
to the Tilden Trust, and the gift to
Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How.,
such charitable, educational and
149: "Uncertainty is indispensa"
scientific purposes as in the judg- ble to all charities. If any one has
ment of the trustees and executors
a right to claim by law, it ceases to
would be mostwisely and substanbe a charity." Thus a bequest to
tially beneficial to the interests of
trustees to be applied by them "acmankind, constituted, in effect, but
cording to their discretion for the
one provision; because, before conadvancement and propagation of
veying the residue to the Tilden
education all over the world," was
Trust, the executors and trustees held by the House of Lords a valid
would be bound to compare the relacharitable bequest, and not void for
tive merits or expediency of this uncertainty: Wicker v. Hume, 7
charity with other general charitH. L. C., 124. So a gift of residue
able, educational and scientific pur- to found at Washington, under the
poses, and as a bequest to general
name of the Smithsonian Institute,
charitable purposes was void for
an establishment for the increase
uncertainty, both provisions of the . and diffusion of knowledge among
thirty-fifth article of the will fell
men, was sustained by Lord LANGtogether.
DALE on the groind that knowledge
With the mere question of conmust mean sound and useful knowlstruction, the practitioner outside edge, and anything for the benefit,
of the State of New York is not
advancement and propagation of
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that was for the advantage of mankind: President ofthe United States
v. Drummond, 7 If.L. C., 14o. So
a gift of residue to be distributed
among the "worthy poor" of a
certain city, Hunt v. Fowler (Ill.),
r
12 N. E. Rep., 33 ; or to a certain
town for its "worthy and unfortunate poor," Dascomb v. Marston
(Maine), 3 Atl. Rep., 888; or to "aid
indigent young men" of a certain
town "in fitting themselves for the
evangelical ministry," Trustees v.
'Whitney.(Conn.), 8 Atl. Rep., 141;
or to an incorporated parish for its
poor, although there be no poor in
the parish at the time of the testator's death, Appeal of Goodrich
(Conn.), 18 At. Rep., 49; or a discretion to testator's sisters to apply
the income from a certain fund to
the relief" of the poor and unfortunate whom we have aided in past
years, and also to others whom
theirjudgmnents may dictate strictly
for private charities, has been sustained: Bullard v. Chandler (Mass.),
2r N. E. Rep., 951. Otherinstances
might be multiplied almost indefinitely. Hence, in the case of a will
making a charitable bequest, it may
be laid down, as a general principle,
that it is immaterial how vague,
indefinite and ?incertain the objects
of the testator's bounty may be,
provided there is (i) a discretionary power vested in some one over
its application to those objects:
STRONG, J., in Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society's Appeal,
30 Pa., 425, 435; Cresson's Appeal,
30 Pa., 45o; Norcross' Adm's v.
Murphy's Executors, 14 (N. J.)
AtI. Rep., 9o3; and, (2), provided
there is a clear intent to give to
what are technically known and
recognized as charitable purposes as
distinguished from mere schemes of

general or indefinite benevolence.
Where the bequest is for charitable
purposes and also for purposes of
an indefinite nature not charitable,
and no apportionment of the bequest is made by the will, so that
the whole might be applied for
either purpose, the whole bequest
is void: Jarman on Wills, 5th ed.,
214.
"If there be any option in the
trustee to apply the funds to purposes which, though liberal-or benevolent, are not such as in this
Court are understood to be charitable, the trusts cannot be executed
here: " Lord LANGDALE in Nash v.
Morley, 5 Beav., 177-183. See Harris v. DuPasquier, 26 L.'T. N. S.,
689; Fowler v. Gailike, Russ. &
Myl. I, 232; Jarman's Est., 8 Ch.
D. 584; Norris v. Thompson, 4 C.
E. Green, 307, 5 C. E. Green, 489;
Kendall v. Granger, 5 Beav., 302;
Ommany v. Butcher, Turn & Rus,
26o; Nixhols v. Allen, 130 (Mass.),
211.

Now on examination it will be
seen that the trust contained in the
thirty-fifth article of Mr. Tilden's
will fulfil both requisites perfectly;
not only are the objects for which
the disbursement is to be made dis.tinctly charitable in the technical
sense, as distinguished from objects
of mere benevolence or liberality,
but the power of disbursement and
selection is distinctly conferred
upon the executors and trustees.
In England or Pennsylvania there
would seem to be no reason whatrver to doubt that such a trust
would be sustained. Its terms are
almost identical with those in
Whicker v. Hume, supra, sustained by the House of Lords.
Unless, therefore, the decision in
the principal case depends upon
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principles peculiar to the State of
New York, it is at variance with
the whole tenor of authority. If it
does depend upon principles peculiar to that State, its value can then
only be determined by tracing the
principles governing the decision to their source, and asertaining how far they are of general application. Now, the ground upon
which the decision is placed is thus
stated by Justice BROWN, in delivering the opinion of the majority of
the Court :
."The law is settled in this State
that a certain designated beneficiary is essential to the creation of
a valid trust." The remark of
Judge WRIGHT, in Levy v. Levy,
33 N. Y., 107, that if there is a
single postulate of the common
law established by an unbroken
line of decisions, it is that a
trust without a certain beneficiary
who can claim its enforcement
is void, has been repeated and reiterated by recent decisions of this
Court: Prichard v. Thompson, 95
N. Y., 76; Holland v. Alcock, io8
id., 312; 14 N. Y. State Rep., 76,;
Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y., 560;
35 N. Y. State Rep., 9o9; and the
objection is not obviated by the existence of a power in the trustees
to select a beneficiary, unless the
class of persons in whose favor the.
power may be exercised has been
-lesignated by the testator with such
iertainty that the Court can ascer.ain who were the objects of the
power." The equitable rule that
prevailed in the English Court of
Chancery, known as the cy pres
doctrine, and which was applied to
uphold gifts for charitable purposes
when no beneficiary was named,has
no place in the jurisprudence of
this State: Holmes v. Mead, 52

N. Y., 332; Holland v.Alcock, sufira.
If the Tilden Trust is but one ot
the beneficiaries which the trustees
may select as an object of the testator's bounty, then it is clear and
conceded by the appellants that
the power conferred by the will
upon the executors is void forindefiniteness and uncertainty in its objects and purposes. The range of
selection is unlimited. It is not
confined to charitable institutions of
this State, or of the United States,
but embraces the whole world.
Nothing could be more indefinite
or unceitain, and broader and more
unlimited power could not be conferred than to apply the estate to
"such charitable, educational and
.scientific purposes as, in the judgment of my executors, will render.
said residue of my property most
widely and substantially beneficial
to mankind."
The decision, it should be observed, does not, as has been some
time supposed, in any way touch
the question of discretionary powers, the validity of which was expressly recognized. The limitation
in the principal case, however,
could not be so sustained because
the testator manifestedly intended
that, while the executorsandtrustees
should exercise their discretion in
deciding what peculiar form of
charity would be most beneficial
to mankind, they should not, under
any circumstances, allow the prop"erty to pass to the heirs and next
of kin by reason of the non-exercise of power. If, therefore, the
limitation be regarded as creating
only a power, the power was in
trust, and as such required the same
certainty as in the case of a trust.
The underlying principle upon
which the decision turns is well
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expre-sed in the opinion of Judge
WRIGHT in Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y.,
107 : " A trust without a certain
beneficiary who can claim its enforcement is void."
In England
and such of the States as recognize the statute of charitable uses,
43 Eliz., or the equitable principles applied in chancery in regard to such trusts, the uncertainty
in the objects of a trust for charitable uses does not affect its
validity, provided a discretion be
lodged somewhere over the application of the fund, since in such
case a Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to see to its enforcement.
In New York this jurisdiction does
not exist, and hence such trusts
are incapable of enforcement and
void. The reason for this given
in the principal case is, that
"the equitable rule that prevailed
in the English Court of Chancery,
known as the cy pres doctrine,
and which was applied to uphold
gifts for charitable purposes where
no beneficiary was named, has no
place in the jurisprudence of this
State:" Citing Holmes v. Mead,
52 N. Y., 322 ; Holland v. Alcock,
io8 N. Y., 312. But this statement
seems somewhat inaccurate. The
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over charities was not derived
from the cy pres doctrine. That
doctrine was derived from the prerogative jurisdiction, and merely
enabled the Court of Chancery,
where the testator's scheme had
failed or become impracticable, to
frame an analogous scheme in accord with his presumed intention,
whereas the ordinary jurisdiction
over charities enabled the Court to
sustain bequests for charitable purposes which would have been void
for uncertainty in other cases.

Whether this latter jurisdiction
is derived from the prerogaive
or from the extraordinary equitalale jurisdiction of the Court,
seems to be a question upon which
there is much difference of opinion. The former view would place
the jurisdiction upon the same
plane as in the case of idiots and
lunatics, and is to. be preferred
on principle: Story, Eq. Jur.,
i188; Taney, C. J., in Fountain v.
Ravenal, 17 How., 397-398. The
latter view is, however, more generally accepted in the United
States: Fountain v. Ravenal, 17
How., 382-398; Witman v. Lex., 17
Story & R., go; Webster v. Morris
(Wis.), 28 N. W. Rep., 363. See
Bridges v. Pleasants; 4 Ire. Eq., 26;
Falfiet v. Lawbon, 50 Conn., 501.
This dinctinction may be of importance, for although the prerogative jurisdiction resides in the
people of the States---TA.y, C. J.
in Fountain v. Ravenal, 17 How.,
395-in many States the courts poEsess only strictly judicial powers:
Webster v. Morris, 28 N. W. Rep.,
363. In others the Cypres Doctrine
is not adopted; and-if the jurisdiction over charities is a branch of
that doctrine, such bequests could
not be sustained: Witman v. Lex,
17 Serg. & R., 9o .
The system of charitable uses as
recognized in England prior to
the Revolution has ceased to exist
in New York. This follows from
the provisions of the Revised
tatutes, Sec. No. 45, I. R. S., 727,
abolishing all uses and trusts, except in certain specified cases, from
the repeal of statute of 43 Eliz., c.
4, in 1788, at a time when both the
bench and bar were of opinion
that the statute was the only source
of the jurisdiction of chancery in

OUTSIDE OF NEW YORK STATE.
the case of trusts for charitable uses,
and from the growth of a system
of incorporated charities, established by a series of acts of A .
sembly, by virtue of which a valid
bequest to charity can only be made
through the instrumentality of a
corporate body, subject to supervision and visitation by the proper
authorities. Such a body is itself
a completely equipped scheme
created by the legislature, and
has power for ever to carry out its
purposes and to ascertain and
designate the individuals who are
to receive the benefit of the charity.
Whatever property it takes it receives not, in legal contemplation,
as trustees, but absolutely, holding
both the legal and equitable titles;
and no question of indefiniteness,
or uncertainty in the beneficiary,
can ever arise upon a conveyance
to such a body. It is precisely like
a conveyance in fee to a natural
person by name: Levy v. Levy,
33N. Y., 97 ; Bascom v. Albertson,
34 N. Y., 584.
"Under this system many doubtful
and conflicting questions disappear
in the more simple inquiry whether
the grantor or divisor of a fund
designed for charity is competent
to give, and whether the organized
body is endowed by law with capacity to receive and to hold and administer the gift:" RAPALLO. J., in
Holland v. Alcock, ioS N. Y., 312.
"Thus the system is harmonious
and symmetrical; but if it is to be
regarded as not intended to express
the entire will of the State on the
subject of charities, and we are to
assume the existence and validity
of charitable uses, outside of the
legislative sanction through corporate charters, State legislation
and policy, from the origin of the
government, are strikingly incon-

sistent and absurd. We have repealed all statutes that support,
maintain and restrict indefinite
uses. We have enacted none defining what, in a legal sense, are
charities. We have a clear and
well-defined mortmain policy restraining and limiting gifts to corporate charities, which are' approved in their principle and design
by the legislature, while indefinite
and perpetual uses, created without
any sanction in respect to their object or otherwise, are freed from all
restraint. We have adopted a mortmain policy applicable to corporations only; one essentially useless
and nugatory, if gifts to unincorporated bodies, without any restraint whatever, were to be tolerated. We have restricted gifts by
will to charitable corporations, in
'certain cases, to one-fourtk of the
tebtator's estate, and declared invalid any gift to them by ill, unless the will be executed at least
tw9 months before the testator's
death; but there is no positive law
restricting devises or bequests to
charitable or indefinite uses, or protecting against improvident wills,
where a corporation is not the
donee:' WRIGHT, J., in Levy v.
Levy, 33 N. Y., 97Hence it seems clear that, inasmuch as the decision in the principal case depends upon principles
peculiar to the law of New York,
deduced from the peculiar provisions of its statute law, it is not
of authority in any State in which
the statute of uses is in force, or
in any State in which its principles have been recognized in the
administration of charitable bequests, even though the statute itself be not in force. Thus in Pennsylvania the principal case would
not be of authority, since although
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the statute of uses is not in force,
it sprinciples have been recognized:
Vidal v. Girard's Ex., supra.
Otherwise, in Maryland, since in
that State it has been expressly
held that the statute is not in force,
and that independently of the statute, a Court of Chancery cannot
sustain and enforce 'a devise to
charitable uses which, if not to a
charity, would on general principles
be void: Dashiel v. Attorney-General, 5 H. & J., 392; Naught v.
Getzendalker, 5 Alt. Rep., 471.
On the other hand in Connecticut
it has been held that a bequest to
general charitable purposes is void,
altbough the statute of uses has
been in part recognized in that
State. Hence, a-bequest of a fund
for such charitable purposes as
A. B. may deem proper is void.
"Whatever might be held on this
question by the courts of Eigland,
or of those States which have
adopted the English doctrine on
the subject, it is very clear that pnder our own decisions, which have
established a definite rule on the
subject in this State, this bequest
cannot be held valid. It is well
established with us that a gift to a
charitable use must designate the
particular charitable use by making
the gift to some charitable corporation whose charter provides for a
charitable use of its funds, or to
some particular object or purpose
that the law recognizes as charitable. It is enough if the object
be mentioned, and the law can see
that it is a charitable one; but it is
not enough that the gift be merely
' to charitable uses,' or 'to be used
in charity,' so long as no selection
is made from the long list of recognized charitable objects. And it is
not enough that some person is
named to whom is given the power

of naming the charity. That is the
testator's own matter. It is his intent that is to determine that. If
be chooses to leave the matter
wholly to the discretion of some
person named, he can do so by
making the gift to him, leaving
him to use his discretion as to the
disposition of it. In this case the
donee takes absolutely, and the lav
doe not trouble itself as to whether
he acts conscientiously in the matter. The testator has chosen to
leave the matter to uncertainty,
and there the law leaves it. The
charitable object, thus required to
be named, may be a benefit to a
class of persons, and therefore uncertain as to the particular persons
of the class that are to receive the
benefit. This uncertainty may
make the bequest void, unless
there is a power given to some person or corporation to make a selection of the individuals: "White v.
Fisk, 22 Conn., 50 ; Adye v.Smith,
44 Conn., 70; Fairfield v. Lawson,
5o Conn., 513; Coit v. Comstock,
51 Conn., 379; Tappan's Appeal,
52 Conn., 412. Here the power
given the widow is not to select
the particular beneficiaries of
a class named, but to select the
charity itself: Bristol v. Bristol,
5 Atl. Rep., 691, 692. See also
other decisions: Bridges v. Pleasants, 4 Ire. Eq., 26, 30; Webster v.
Morris, 28 (Wis.), N. W. Rep.,
363; Hoffen's Est., 36 (Wis.), N.
W. Rep., 363. In States, therefore,
in which the statute of charitable
uses is thus far in force, it would
seem that the principles ofthedecision in Tilden v. Green would apply
to bequests for general "charitable purposes," though not to cases
in which the testator had specified
the particular kind of charity to be
benefited: Howard v. Page.

